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"PROMPT, ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE":
A UNIVERSAL STANDARD OF
COMPENSATION?
FRANK G. DAWSON:
BURNS H. WESTON

PRIVATE foreign-wealth deprivations1 raise some of the most contentious issues of contemporary international law. Many commentators assert that all deprivations by States of alien-owned wealth within
their boundaries are circumscribed by the orthodox requirement of "full"
or "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation?2 Yet because this
prescription evolved from nineteenth century socio-economic and legal
thought which sought to internationalize Western European presuppositions of private property ownership,3 it behooves us to examine its use
and applicability to mid-twentieth century perspectives. 4 The concern
of present-day debate is to decide whether, in the context of general and
fundamental socio-economic and political reform, less than "full" compensation may be paid for the taking of foreign-owned property. The
principle of compensation itself is seldom challenged. Since the question
is not whether compensation should be forthcoming, therefore, the proper
focus of legal analysis should be upon techniques by which the
timing, the amount, and the form thereof may be realistically determined.
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. By this is meant state action against private alien wealth over which States claim
jurisdictional competence, totally or partially depriving alien o.ners of title or control. The
term is used to avoid the normative ambiguities of the terms "confiscation" and "espropriation," the former referring to deprivations -ithout the offer of compensation and the
latter to deprivations accompanied by an offer thereof.
2. The assertion excludes circumstances involving international treaties or contracts
specifying another standard.
3. "The international community in its inception was confined to only sone Christian
states of Europe. It expanded vithin very narrow limits to embrace, first, the other
Christian States of Europe and next their ow.n offshoots in other continents. It thus
retained until recently its racial exclusiveness in full and its geographical and other limitations in part. The international law which the worldwide community of States today inherits
is the law which owes its genesis and growth, first, to the attempts of theze States to
regulate their mutual intercourse in their own interests and, secondly, to the use made of
it during the period of colonialism." Guha Roy, Is the Law of Recponsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. Z63, 866
(1961).
4. While recognizing that wealth deprivations assume many forms reflecting an array of
techniques, this discussion focuses upon problems of compensation resulting from direct and
overt takings.
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I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The international law governing private foreign-wealth deprivations
can best be characterized as the accommodation and reconciliation of
two distinct interests: the national interest of every State in exercising
authority over and regulating the use of all forms of property within its
territorial competence;' and, the common interest of the international
community in fostering the maximum production and flow of wealth
across state boundaries. Specifically, the most meaningful policy preference for the depriving State is the maintenance of an international legal
framework of sufficient flexibility to enable it to maximize the economic,
political, and social aspirations of its people.' To the foreign trader and
investor, on the other hand, the most meaningful policy consideration
is the stabilization of expectations respecting his ownership of, and gain
from, property located abroad. 7 International law seeks to harmonize
these distinct, yet interdependent, interests to achieve, in a world beset
by conflict, that stability which is requisite to the international common
interest of securing an optimum realization of material and spiritual
values for all men.
Legal norms relating to foreign wealth deprivations have been determined, at any given period in history, by the economic, political, and
social processes of the time. From about the mid-nineteenth century to
World War I, the international scene, dominated by European cultures,
was characterized by impressive material transformations-the acceleration of industrialization, the harnessing of new sources of power, farreaching technical improvements in agriculture, increasingly rapid trans5. It should be noted that contemporary opinion asserts that States incur international
responsibility, in the absence of treaty obligation, not by the taking itself, but by failure to
provide compensation therefor. This is logical owing to the conceded competence of
States to control forms of wealth within their territorial boundaries. See Baade, Indonesian
Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 801, 808
(1960); Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests
of Aliens, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 545, 555 (1961).
6. Thus, in 1955, debate in the United Nations General Assembly centered upon a draft
convention adopted by the Third Committee of the General Assembly, article 2 of which
read: "The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of .international economic
cooperation based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." U.N. Doc. No.
A/C.3/L.489 (1955), discussed in Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and
Resources, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 854, 856-57 (1956).
7. "Foreign investment is voluntary; it cannot be coerced. Unless there is a reasonable
prospect of profit and an assurance of security, it simply will not occur. In many
undeveloped countries, though the prospect of profit is present, the assurance of security
is not." Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade 145 (1949).
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portation, the expansion of commerce, improved techniques in finance
and corporate organization, large aggregations of capital, and political
and economic imperialism-in respect to which the State played a comparatively negative role, protecting a regime of laissez-faire and assuring the "sanctity" of private wealth.8 The period was especially marked
by the enormous expansion of British overseas investments which were
assured diplomatic protection reinforced by the most powerful fleet and
the largest empire in the world.'
Interference in the economic process during the nineteenth century,
therefore, was confined principally to the regulation of private wealth.
Governmental wealth-deprivation powers were exercised but rarely, and
then, only for limited purposes. Private foreign-wealth deprivations
were never matters of major national policy, but were confined to
limited deprivations involving isolated takings of amounts of property
insignificant to the aggregate of foreign-owned wealth in the depriving
State.'" The taking of a parcel of land from a British subject for the
royal gardens of the King of Greece,"' the seizure of insubstantial foreign railway properties in Portuguese East Africa,' and the appropriation of the property of several "dissolved" foreign "religious communities"'1 3 were typical of such deprivations. It was primarily during this
period of limited deprivations that the legal policies concerning compensation were formulated. These orthodox preferences, absent contrary
treaty provisions, condition the legality of the taking of foreign wealth
upon "public utility" and payment of "full" or "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation, in lieu of restitution.14 The standard of compensation was succinctly stated by Fachiri in 1919: "[I]f a state expropriates the physical property of an alien without the payment of full
compensation it commits a wrong .... ,15
3. See generally Ellsworth, The International Economy 156-75 (Zd cd. 1959).
9. See generally Carrington, The British Overseas, Exploits of a Nation of Shopheeprs
402-S33 (1950).

10. See Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative Approach, 17 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 453, 459 (1950). The International Law Commission refers to limited deprivations
as "acts of expropriation stricto sensu." Fourth Report on International Rezponmibility,
U.-N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/119, at 27 (1959).
11. Finlay Case, 39 Brit. Foreign State Papers 410 (149).
12. Case of the Delagoa Bay Ry. (1891), 2 Moore, Arbitrations 1265 (IS93).
13. Expropriated Religious Properties Case (1910), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 7

(1920).
14. See, e.g., Walter Fletcher Smith Case (Smith v. Compafia Urbanizadora del Parque
de Marianao), U.S. State Dep't Press Release, May 16, 1929, 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 3S4 (1930);

Case of the Norwegian Claims Against the United States (1922), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 307 (1922).

15. Fachiri, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 10 Brit. Yb. Int'l L, 321 55
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Historic practice to date' 6 reveals little disagreement when applying
these prescriptions to contemporary limited deprivations. A unique feature of the twentieth century, on the other hand, is the direct interference
and participationof the State in the national and international economic
order, with its concomitant effects upon traditional concepts of private
wealth. Two world wars, the Great Depression, the "bipolarization" of
the world, the spread of nationalism, the development of the corporate
and welfare states, the formation of state trading monopolies, and the
consequent dislocation of traditional social, economic, and political patterns have precipitated demands for long-overdue social and economic
reforms (especially in those regions often indiscriminately termed "underdeveloped"), the fulfillment of which, it is hoped, will foster increased
self-respect and human dignity. 17 The growing intensity of unsatisfied
demands for wealth, power, knowledge, respect, health, security, and
other values' 8 may be met often only through centralized planning and
large-scale public participation in finance and technology which, necessarily, will result in assaults upon, and conflicts with, traditional values
rooted in another century. 9 States are today, therefore, less willing to
rely exclusively upon the individual entrepreneur as the instrument of
policy through which community aspirations may be achieved.20 As John
H. Herz has written:
(1929). It is interesting to note that Fachiri did not appear to contemplate the nature of
nonphysical property and its relation to problems of foreign wealth deprivation.
16. Chorz6w Factory Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7, at 4 (1926); P.C.I.J., ser. A, No.
13, at 4 (1928) (merits).
17. Cf. U.N. Charter, art. 55(a). See also McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification
and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1959).
18. For a discussion of such values, see McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 17, at 22-26.
19. See Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part
of Universal International Law?, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 863, 875 (1961). One writer suggests,
more negatively, that the historical development of increased state Interference with
traditionally accepted "proprietary rights" has had and will continue to have adverse effects
upon the personal freedom of the individual because it represents the conflict between
"collectivism" and "individualism." See Adriaanse, Confiscation in Private International
Law 2 (1956). A more favorable argument is well stated by Sir John Fischer Williams:
"To seek to entrench individualism as against collectivism by a canon of international law,
is not merely to take an economic doctrine out of the sphere of domestic legislation, where
alone it properly belongs, but also to run a grave risk of discrediting international law in
the eyes of those who accept collectivist doctrines either for all property or for a part of
it. Such action will in the end neither help to preserve private property nor strengthen
the power of international law." Williams, International Law and the Property of Aliens,
9 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 1, 21-22 (1928).
20. "Since the end of World War II, governments have, to an increasing extent, accepted
the premise that in order to achieve certain vital aims of public economic policy, It was
necessary to place not only control but outright ownership of public assets in public hands."
Einaudi, Nationalization in France and Italy 4 (1955).
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The great changes in state functions which have taken place since the days of
laissez-faire liberalism have had a direct influence upon the meaning and importance
of the right of expropriation. Little by little not only so-called social legislationin the form of the regulation of labor conditions, taxation for social or other nonfinancial purposes, etc.-which more and more has come to be included in the
state's police power, but direct interference with private property in the form of
abolishing it, transferring it to the state, or redistributing it among other groups of
the people have been frequent in many parts of the world, and not only in backward
ones. New economic policies striving for autarchy have brought about not only
indirect interference, such as currency legislation, but in certain countries have
directly interfered with those two traditional rights of the private owner (especially
the entrepreneur and the land owner) which had come to be considered essential
elements of private property: his right of management and disposal, and his profits.
The clearest example of the new type of state interference is, however, the direct
2
taking away of private rights in the form of outright abolition or redistribution. '

Thus, the planned, large-scale taking of alien property has become today
the most publicized form of foreign-wealth deprivation. Though once
matters of only limited concern, foreign-wealth deprivations are today
subjects of national policy.22
Extensive foreign-wealth deprivations are equated, with varying degrees of accuracy, with "nationalization," "socialization," or "the redistribution of wealth." 'as Whichever term is used, each presumes that
extensive deprivations involve radical policy change respecting all or
part of a nation's economic structure. Hence, extensive foreign-wealth

deprivations do not restrict, eliminate, or transfer foreign wealth to

attain the comparatively narrow objectives of limited deprivations.
Rather, they assist in the reorganization and administration of a sector
or sectors of the economy so as to subject the means of production,

formerly owned by private entrepreneurs, to centralized state control
and responsibility, if not ownership.
It may be difficult, of course, to distinguish dearly between limited
and extensive deprivations, since nationalizations may not always be
21. Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 243, 256 (1941).
22. See generally Einaudi, Nationalization in France and Italy 4 (1955); Doman,
Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 1125 (1943);
Foighel, Nationalization-A Study in the Protection of Alien Property in International Law,
26 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 89 (1956); Jewkes, The Nationalization of
Industry, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 615 (1953); Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign-Ovned
Property in Its Impact on International Law, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 7G9 (1951); Re, The
Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 36 Blinn. L. Rev. 323 (1952).
23. Friedman distinguishes between "nationalization" and "socialization," as-erting
that the former is a measure of an "economic character and permitting the reorganization
of certain forms of property within a given sector of the economy in order to eurure their
survival amid new conditions of production." Friedman, Expropriation in International Law
6 (1953). He holds further that the object of "socialization" is "to secure the benefits of
technical reorganization to new social classes acceding to power." Ibid.
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extensive deprivations. This alone demonstrates the futility of attempting
to establish rigid criteria purporting applicability in all situations. 4
Nevertheless, there are relevant factual questions which should be considered when seeking to delineate between these types of deprivations.
For example: what is the size and value of the property taken, in absolute terms and in relation to the size and value of all similar property
located in the depriving State? What is the importance of the seized
property-strategic or otherwise-to the economy of the depriving State?
What was its past and what might be its future contribution to the gross
national product of the depriving State? What sums of money and other
forms of wealth are involved? How many people are directly involved?
In short, a meaningful consideration of the underlying facts, outcomes
and effects of each deprivation is required.
Not only have the differences in nature, scope, and effect between
limited and extensive deprivations not been adequately explored, but
the consequences of these differences in international law have seldom,
if ever, been subjected to systematic analysis.2 5 Despite ascertainable
profound disparities between limited and extensive foreign-wealth deprivations, considerable international legal opinion, nevertheless, continues
to apply the orthodox preference for "full" or "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation to both types of deprivation, sometimes even
expressly disregarding the distinctions involved. Thus, speaking before
the American Foreign Law Association in 1960, B. A. Wortley remarked:
The first point I want to make is that nationalization, which is the seizure of a
24. The distinction drawn between limited and extensive deprivations should be recalled
throughout the length of this discussion. Because nationalizations may sometimes be
characterized as limited deprivations, the orthodox compensation standard may not always
be inappropriate. While motivated by desires to achieve economic reform, a nationalization
may be of such insubstantial economic and financial effect as to merit application of the
orthodox standard. Since the diacritical line may be difficult to draw, labels can be
misleading.
25. The task would appear more difficult than in 1926 when, during an International
Law Association discussion of the protection of private property, it was asserted that the
Soviet Union, because of her "attack upon the international agreement as to the sacredness
of private property" and her failure to "agree with the common conscience of all other
civilized nations upon its most difficult question of morals and ethics" had "excluded and
excommunicated herself from the society of civilized nations." Herz, Expropriation of
Alien Property-An Inquiry Into the Sociology of International Law, 8 Soc. Research 63,
65 (1941). The recent Harvard Draft attempts, although inadequately, to distinguish the
consequential relevance of these two types of deprivations in article 10(4). Harvard Law
School Preliminary Draft of the Convention on the International Responsibility of States
for Injuries to Aliens, art. 10(4) (1959) ; see Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for
Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 Am. 3. Int'l L. 545, 553 (1961). A similar
but more comprehensive distinction is made by Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/119, at 63 (1959).
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country's economy, does not differ in principle from other forms of epropriation,
i.e., from confiscation without payment, from requisition in an emergency with payment after the event, or from classical expropriation after prior payment.0

Elsewhere, Wortley has argued that "the state that wishes to conduct

political experiments which result in its enrichment at the expense of
the foreign owners cannot, as a matter of principle, refuse restitution or

full compensation.

."

This proposition has recently been represented

on the Continent by Adriaanse27 a and in the United States by Kissam and

Leach.2b
Perhaps the most celebrated expression of the orthodox position
was that of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull who, while
26. Wortley, Some Latest Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Nationalization, Summary of Address, American Foreign Law As'n, New York, Feb. 15, 19CO0
(mimeograph).
27. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law 115 (1959); cf. Domie, Foreign
Nationalizations, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 5S5, 607 (1961).
27a. Adriaanse states: "[TJhe possibility to expropriate should not depend upon what
the State wants, but on the contrary, it should be limited by the possibility of [full] payment by the State. We should strive to make this rule of public international law an
axiom . . . ." Adriaanse, Confiscation in Private International Law 166 (1956).
27b. Kissam and Leach have written: "Unless restricted by treaty or other agreement, a
State has the right under international law to expropriate property of foreign nationals
within its territorial jurisdiction, but only if the expropriation is made for reasons of public
utility, and only upon the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compenation. The
requirement of compensation is equally applicable in cases of both general and individual
expropriation .... Economic difficulties of the expropriating State . . . do not justify the
taking of property without payment, since poverty is no excuse for unlawful conduct,
Any action taken in defiance of these principles
whether by individuals or by States ....
should not be accorded recognition by other States." Kissam & Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of Concession Contracts, 23 Fordham L. Rev. 177, 214
(1959). The same authors write: "Beneficial as nationalization may ultimately prove to be
to a State and to its citizens, there is little to justify placing the burden of a State's economic
experimentation upon the shoulders of the foreign investor, who has neither any voice in
the decision to indulge in such experimentation, nor any status to enjoy whatever benefits
may ultimately be derived therefrom." Id. at 189. The view that 'foreign investors wil
derive few benefits from a nationalization has, in the short run, probable valldity. A
long-range view recognizes, however, the economic interdependence of the international
community which tends to extend and share the benefits of the improved economic and
social well-being of the depriving State to other nations, thereby, directly or indirectly,
improving the status of the previously deprived alien. The present beneficial economic
relationship between Mexico and the United States may well be a case in point. Thus, while
United States private investment in Mexico had fallen by 1943 to 422 million from the
1914 total of $335 million and the 1930 total of $710 million (which figures reprefent longterm investment), the direct investment figures alone for 1953 had risen to $781 milion.
See United States-Latin American Relations, Compilation of Studies, Study No. 4, Senate
Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, S. Doc. No. 125, S6th Cong., 2d Sesz. 296

(1960).
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acknowledging the "validity" of the Mexican agrarian takings,2"
contended in a Note to the Mexican Government that "under every rule
of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private
property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate
and effective payment thereof."2 9 Thus, despite historical change and
predictable future inroads upon traditional concepts of private wealth
ownership,
the ancient belief [is] kept alive that government [is] still confronted by an
unchanging and rigid concept of property rights, and that the only way to go forward
[is] to deal with title deeds as if they still have the fearsome strength given them
30
by the Napoleonic Code.

While these orthodox publicists are not alone, 3 ' considerable opinion
seeks to modify the orthodox compensation "rule" in the modern extensive foreign wealth deprivation context. Thus, Konstantin Katzarov and
other Eastern Europeans suggest that compensation for claims arising
from extensive deprivations be fixed by "new criteria. 182 Many Western
writers are similarly persuaded. As Doman has observed:
Nationalization for alleged social or strategic reasons hardly can be fitted in the
category of eminent domain; nor do the nationalization measures fall under the
concept of the police power which would be inordinately difficult to distinguish from
eminent domain. The post-war nationalization acts do not come under any traditional
category of a legal system based on capitalist economy. Post-war nationalization represents a revolutionary development and it would be futile to attempt to associate
it should be looked upon as a sid generis matter
it with past legal concepts. Rather,
33
and be dealt with accordingly.

28. The Note of the Mexican Ambassador of Aug. 3, 1938 pointed out the Importance
of the program of agrarian reform to the future of the Mexican people: "On the one hand,
there are weighed the claims of justice and the improvement of a whole people, and on the
other hand, the purely pecuniary interests of some individuals . . . [T]he future of the
nation could not be halted by the impossibility of paying immediately the value of properties belonging to a small number of foreigners who seek only a lucrative end." 3 Bishop,
International Law 518 (1949).
29. Note of Secretary of State Hull of Aug. 22, 1938, Press Releases, U.S. Dep't of
State, vol. 19, No. 465, at 138; 5 Foreign Rel. U.S. 647, 677 (1938). (Emphasis added.)
30. Einaudi, Nationalization in France and Italy 4 (1955).
31. See Cheng, Expropriation in International Law, 21 Solicitor 98 (1954); Cheng,
General Principles of Law as Applied in International Courts and Tribunals (1953). See also
Brandon, Legal Aspects of Private Foreign Investments, 18 Fed. B.J. 298 (1958); McNair,
The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht 218 (1959); Wehberg, I Annuaire L'Institut de Droit International 110
(1950).
32. Katzarov, The Validity of the Act of Nationalisation in International Law, 22 Mod.
L. Rev. 639, 647 (1959).
33. Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 Colum. L. Rev.
1125, 1128 (1948).
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The logical consequence of this observation has been ably expressed
by the late Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht:
The rule is clearly established that a State is bound to respect the property of
aliens. This rule is qualified, but not abolished ....
[A] modification must be
recognized in cases in which fundamental changes in the political system and
economic structure of the State or far-reaching social reforms entail interference,

on a large scale, with private property. In such cases, neither the principle of absolute
respect for alien private property nor rigid equality with the dispossessed nationals

offer a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. It is probable that, consistently with
legal principle, such solution must be sought in the granting of partial compensation.3 4

It is not solely the influence of collectivist philosophy that calls for this
modification, but also, and perhaps primarily, the glaring imbalance between poor and prosperous nations compelling the former to achieve
social and economic reforms within a minimum period of time. 5 For, as
Dunn has observed, if extensive deprivations are to be governed by
traditional compensation standards the dominant capital-exporting powers
could exercise a veto power over legitimate attempts of poorer nations
to achieve fundamental economic and social reform."' Hence, Kuhn
has urged that the traditional doctrine of compensation must yield to,
among other factors, "considerations of the debtor's political instability
or its capacity to pay. ' 37 He concludes, "a compromise in the method of
compensation is not a compromise in the principles of international law
... .,,s These same and, we submit, realistic views are reflected in the
writings of numerous scholars, including Baade,O Bindschedler, ° Del34. 1 Oppenheim, International Law 318 (Lauterpacht ed., 1943).
35. Thus, Richard N. Gardner has written: "It is not sufficiently understood that the
gap in living standards within the free world is actually widening, not decreasing. In !some
of the less developed countries, population growth is causing an absolute decline in p2r
capita income. In most others, whatever increase has taken place has been far leas than
increases in per capita income in the industrialized countries. This wide and growing gap
in living standards is a time bomb which ticks ominously beneath the surface of contemporary affairs." International Measures for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign
Investment, 53 Am. Soe'y Int'l L. Proceed. 255, 257 (1959). Illustrative of the compulsion to
achieve material progress in a minimum amount of time was former Brazilian President
Kubitchek's well-publicized slogan, "Fifty years' progress in five.'
36. Duan, International Law and Private Property Rights, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 166, 17S
(1923).
37. Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property in Its Impact on International
Law, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 709 (1951).
38. Id. at 711-12.
39. Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply, S4 Am.
J. Int'l L. 801 (1960).
40. Bindschedler, La Protection de la Proprit Prive en Drolt International Public, go
Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 173 (1956).
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Foighel, 43 Friedman, 44 Gould,45 Lapradelle, 40 and

who contend, with varying emphasis, that, while there remains
an obligation within the context of extensive wealth deprivations to
afford some recovery to deprived aliens, the compensation standards are
not those properly invoked in limited deprivations.
Thus, the issue has been joined, the debate finding its way even into
question
the conference rooms of the United Nations where the entire
48
has assumed deeper significance in the East-West struggle.
II.

THE ORTHODOX COMPENSATION PREFERENCES

The orthodox view requiring "prompt" ,compensation anticipates
immediate recovery whether the deprivation be limited or extensive, some
of its adherents even insisting upon prior payment. 49 Historic practice,
however, seriously challenges theories of immediate or prior payment,
emphasizing instead the deferred character of compensation. Thus courts
have ruled, even for limited deprivations, merely that compensation be
paid "as quickly as possible" 5 or within a "reasonable time"r1 or "in
due time."15 2 Moreover, while many State constitutions decree "prior"
or "prompt" payment, at least as many, reflecting international practice,
either do not mention "prompt" or expressly accept deferred payment
in certain emergencies.5 3 In practice, the term "prompt" seems not to
have been defined by rigid formulae. Its meaning would appear influenced by the peculiarities of each case.
41.

Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private

International Law, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 755 (1957).
42. DeVisscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law 193 (1957).
43. Foighel, Nationalization-A Study of the Protection of Alien Property in International Law, 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 188 (1957).
44. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law (1953).
45. Gould, An Introduction to International Law 467 (1957).

46.

Lapradelle, Effects Internationaux des Nationalizations, 43 Annuaire de L'Institut do

Droit International 42 (1950).

47. Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative Approach, 17 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 458 (1950).
48. This is exemplified by the contrasting statements of the Soviet Union and the
United States representatives concerning the Suez Canal nationalization. See U.N. Gen.
Ass. Off. Rec. 10th Sess., 3d Comm., 676th meeting, Nov. 29, 1955.

49.

Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, 28-29 (1959).

50.

Goldenberg v. Germany (1928),

3 Revue de Droit International 559 (1929).

51. Portugal v. Germany (1930), Ann. Dig. Int'l L. Cases 150, 151 (1929-1930).
52. Case of the Norwegian Claims Against the United States (1922), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l
Arb. Awards 307 (1922).
53. Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/119, at 56 (1959).
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This uncertainty notwithstanding, it would seem neither unrealistic
nor oppressive, to apply a stringent "prompt" requirement in limited
deprivations since the sums involved presumably would be of such
insignificance as to permit swift payment, thereby promoting a stability
of expectation through rapid readjustment in the investment community.
In extensive deprivations, however, "prompt" payment becomes less
practicable, if not impossible, since States engaging in such deprivations
usually lack the resources necessary for compliance. Rigidly enforced,
"4prompt" payment would permit comprehensive reforms only at the
price of financial crisis. As the International Law Commission has observed:
It is clear that the time-limit for the payment of the agreed compensation
necessarily depends on the circumstances in each case and in particular on the
expropriating State's resources and actual capacity to pay. Even in the case of
"partial" compensation, very few states have in practice been in a sufficiently strong
economic and financial position to be able to pay the agreed compensation immediately and in full.54

Consequently, deferred payment, with interest as a substitute for
"prompt" payment, is widely accepted as satisfactory in extensive
wealth deprivations.'In addition to the stipulation for "prompt" payment, orthodox theory
proclaims that compensation must be "adequate" or "full"; that is, it
must correspond to the value of the property taken. The question of
value, of course, raises enormous complexities in both limited and extensive deprivations and demands separate and detailed inquiry. 0 Moreover, the unqualified use of this traditional terminology tends to ignore
such peripheral factors as the possible inflation of claims or the timing
of the assessment which may influence the valuation and, hence, the
amount of compensation. Apparently recognizing these ambiguities,
courts have held, in limited deprivation cases, that a State must "make
57
or "'make good" the losses
full reparation for the injuries done by it"1
54. Id. at 59.

55. Article 10(4) of the recent Harvard Draft recognizes that the "prompt" compnamation
requirement should be relaxed "if property is taken by a State in furtherance of a general
program of economic and social reform . . ." The recent Report of the Committee on
International Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, however, terms this "the most
striking departure from what the United States Government and the preponderance of
international lawyers in this country have regarded as established international law.." 15
Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 414, 417 (1960).
56. It would appear that, to date, no such effort has been made.
57. Case of the Delagoa Bay Ry. (IS91), 2 Moore, Arbitrations 1S65 (1S93).
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suffered, and that, while "fair compensation" must equal the value of
the property taken,59 it must not exceed the fair market value"0 or include speculative prices.0 1
Assuming the inherent difficulties relating to "full" or "adequate" compensation are not insurmountable, again it would not seem unduly burdensome to the depriving State to premise compensation in limited deprivations
upon the fair market value or the "value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the day of payment. 01 2 Where
deprivations are extensive, however, the orthodox view once more presents acute difficulties. To assert, as do some, that States lacking sufficient gold reserves, foreign exchange, or other financial resources should
not undertake social and economic reforms which may necessitate enacting extensive deprivation laws is both unrealistic and patronizing.
After years of political or economic inferiority, nations which are but
recently independent or which seek to transform outmoded socio-economic institutions are unlikely to accept voluntarily externally conceived
restrictions incompatible with their legitimate aspirations. Extensive
deprivations may be of such absolute and relative magnitude as to render
"full" compensation truly impossible. This is reflected in many postwar
national constitutions which refer to "fair," "equitable," or "reasonable"
compensation or which, properly or not, expressly leave the quantum of
actual compensation to state discretion at the time of the taking.05
Moreover, recent opinion64 and practice suggest that "partial" compensation in this context has become more the norm than the exception.
The remaining element of the trinity is the requirement that compensation be "effective"; that is, in a medium of exchange of maximum
value to the deprived alien, preferably in his own legal currency. Payment
in limited deprivations, according to the Permanent Court of International Justice, should be in a "hard" currency, or at least in the most
stable available currency. 5 The United States-Panama Claims Commission, however, did not deem the term "expropriated" to imply an
obligation to pay money compensation, but suggested that "reciprocal
58. The Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 1, at 32 (1923).
59. The Chorz6w Factory Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 13, at 46 (1928) (merits).
60. See Hyde, Compensation for Expropriation, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 108 (1939).
61. Case of the Norwegian Claims Against the United States (1922), 1 U.N. Rep.
Int'l Arb. Awards 307 (1922).
62. The Chorz6w Factory Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 13, at 47 (1928) (merits).
63. Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/119, at 53 (1959).
64. See notes 32-47 supra and accompanying text.
65. The Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 1, at 32 (1923).
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transfer of other property" might be sufficient,"' thus impliedly recognizing the existence of occasional difficulties with "effective" payment even
in limited takings. For example, great imbalances in foreign trade may
sometimes pose serious "effective" payment problems. Even "hard" payments may be of little "effective" value if currency restrictions inhibit
export from, and reinvestment in, the depriving State."
Recognizing these problems, "effective" payment would seem, nevertheless, a reasonable goal in limited deprivations, not only to assure
minimum stability in the investment community, but to encourage reinvestment either in the depriving State or elsewhere. Extensive deprivations introduce difficulties of larger proportion, however, due to the
vastness of the takings, to desires to terminate private ownership entirely in all or certain economic sectors, and to the need to retain a
minimum of "hard" currency to effectuate the undertaken reforms. Consequently, claimant States have recently been disposed, however reluctantly, to accept payment in government bonds or those of newly established state-controlled enterprises.s Bonds redeemable in "soft"
currencies, of course, may be of small value at maturity due to inflation, devaluation, inconvertibility, or general monetary instability.
That these disadvantages must somehow be reconciled with apparent
state reluctance to adhere, by more traditional means, to the theory of
"effective" compensation, is well illustrated by the negotiations of the
ill-fated International Trade Organization. c9 Thus, Canada stated that
if it were to take the property of American investors, compensation
in United States dollars would not necessarily be forthcoming; nor did
Canada agree that any local currency would always be sufficient. The
general consensus, however, was that the medium of payment
should at least be "useful." Continuing inability to resolve such problems naturally renders the "effective" nature of the payment a matter
of considerable uncertainty, not easily answered by predetermined
norms. The form of compensation in extensive deprivations would seem
66. Caselli Claim (1933), Ann. Dig. Int'l L. Cases, No. 195, at 441.
67. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law 103 (1959).
6S. See Doman, Compensation for Nationalized Property in Post-War Europ , 3
Int'l L. Q. 323 (1950).
69. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade 140-52 (1949). It is interesting to note that
lawyers and businessmen in Europe and the United States appear to be returning to the

multilateral investment code approach, the most salient efforts being those of Hermann
Abs of Germany and Sir Hartley Shawcross of Great Britain. See Gardner, International
Measurers for the Promotion of Foreign Investment, 53 Am. Sc'y Intl L. Procted. 255,

257 (1959).
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best determined by special agreement of the parties or by the "discretion"
of the decision-maker.7"
While disagreement exists as to the timing, the amount, and the form
of payment required by international law for extensive deprivations, a
brief examination of representative twentieth century settlements reveals
that claimant States have never received "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. Recovery has been afforded largely through diplomatic agreements and en bloc settlements geared to the practical realities
of the contemporary world rather than, as in limited deprivation cases,
through special awards of mixed claims commissions and arbitral tribunals based on the merits of individual claims.
III.

TWENTIETH CENTURY EXTENSIVE DEPRIVATION SETTLEMENTS

The Mexican agrarian and oil deprivations present perhaps the earliest
illustrations of the futility of confronting extensive wealth deprivations
with orthodox demands.71 By the Constitution of 1917, the Mexican
Government assumed ownership of all national lands and waters, acquiring the power, inter alia, to cause private use to conform to the needs
of the general welfare. The 1923 Bucareli Conference provided but
temporary relief to threatened United States landowners, for the Alien
Land Law of 1925 limited the amount of individual foreign land ownership, offering compensation in bonds to aliens for such amounts of their
land as had exceeded the statutory limit and had, therefore, been seized.
United States protests over the inadequacy of compensation produced
few results until 1938. The United States had contended that Mexico
could not lawfully take alien property except upon payment, in advance,
in a "prompt, adequate and effective" manner. Mexico had argued that
the extensive land deprivations were ipso facto lawful, and, while acknowledging a general obligation to grant recovery under international
law, contended that the time, amount, and manner of payment could be
determined only pursuant to her own laws which, be it noted, were
cognizant of the distinctions between limited and extensive takings.
While neither government officially modified its original position,
Mexico finally agreed in 1938 to the establishment of a joint commission to settle $10 million of agrarian claims accumulated since 1927,
and made a good faith down payment of $1 million. By the MexicanAmerican Agreement of 1941, which resolved all prior agrarian and other
70. See Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative Approach, 17 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 458, 461 (1950).
71. See generally Call, The Mexican Venture cbs. 5-6 (1953); Cline, The United States
and Mexico chs. 11-12 (1961); Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 327
(1940).
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claims exclusive of those arising out of the petroleum seizures, Mexico
promised to pay $40 million in annual installments, as against
claims totalling more than $350 million. 72 It would appear that these
installment payments have been faithfully and punctually met.73
Alien-owned oil properties in Mexico were seized pursuant to executive
decree in 1938. Claims for "prompt, adequate and effective" payment
again were made. The Mexican Minister of Finance ordered twenty
per cent of the sales proceeds of the seized oil properties to be reserved
for compensation payments. After voluminous diplomatic exchange, a
Mexican-United States settlement was finally obtained in 1942, British
settlements not being concluded until 1947. None of these settlements
can be said to have met orthodox prescriptions, but, rather, involved
installment payments over several years, totalling much less than the
1938 value of the properties. The United States, on behalf of the American oil companies who estimated the total value of their holdings at $260
million, finally settled for a sum approximating $24 million plus interest
at three per cent. British oil interests valued their properties at almost
the same amount, but ultimately settled for the considerably larger sum
of approximately $130 million including interest.7"
Although faced with the new social and economic forces generated
by the Mexican Revolution, 73 arbitral decisions in particular instances
and diplomatic correspondence in general nevertheless emphasized the
72. See American-Tlexican Claims Report, US. Dep't of State Pub. 2359, Arb. Ser. 9,
at 4 (194S). This lump sum settlement of all prior nonpetroleum claims malhe diiicult a

determination of the amounts awarded for the agrarian seizures themselves. It is, n vertheless, noteworthy that the agreement was, in fact, a lump sum settlement of a variety of
claims stemming from the complexities of the Mexican Revolution.
73. See Cline, The United States and Mexico 243 (1940).
74. Id. at 243-51. The disparity between the United States and British settlements
would appear to be due, according to Cline, to the divergent historic relationship3 between
Mexico and these two countries: "The Mexican nation, for historic reasons, had fastened
onto the American companies as the storm center of emotional diatribes against 'foreign
imperialism.' In a considerably less heated atmosphere where historic wrongs and rights
were not dragged in, to muddle and distort the specific issues at hand, the British made
their peace with Mexico. They were no more successful than the United States in getting
the Mexican government to retreat from the Constitution of 1917, but their companico did
possibly receive a proportionately greater recompense than did their American counterparts." Id. at 250.
75. "La Revolud6n Mexicana is the all embracing name for a vast social transformation,
an attempt to give to the masses land, hygiene, education, to reshape the country completely, to create a new Mexican nation, to emancipate the Indian, who represnts ...
more than 90 per cent of the population, and to liberate the pen through an economic
and spiritual higher standard of living." Kunz, The Mexican Expropriation, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q.
327, 328 (1940).
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orthodox "rules" governing limited deprivations. Despite the homage
paid to those principles, political, economic, and wartime realities were
apparently the decisive factors contributing to the compromise settlements.
Between 1945 and 1949, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia enacted extensive deprivation laws affecting
both aliens and nationals and permitting the taking of mines, branches
of industry, transportation and communication facilities, commercial
enterprises, banks and insurance companies, as well as other properties.7 6 Although acknowledging a duty to pay some compensation to
deprived aliens"7 none of the Eastern European nationalization laws
complied with the orthodox "prompt, adequate and effective" restrictions. Poland, for example, provided for payment in long-term securities
within one year of the determination of the amount due, with payment
in cash or "other values" expressly restricted to exceptional circumstances. The amount of compensation was to be determined by a special
commission whose final decision would be conditioned upon stipulated
factors, i.e., the net value of the assets on the day of taking, the decrease
in value of the enterprise due to war damage, special considerations such
as the value and duration of concessions and licenses, and the general
decrease in national wealth due to wartime depredation. Similar unorthodox patterns were repeated in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia with varying degrees of specificity. 7 To a
large extent, therefore, the time, amount, and form of recovery remained
an open question to which claimant States offered diverse responses, some
of which were conditioned upon 1947 peace treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania providing for the restoration of properties of
United Nations' nationals seized during the war, or for compensation
in amounts up to two-thirds of the war damage suffered.
76. See The Status of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources,
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.97/5/Rev., at 142-43.
77. All the nationalization laws expressly provided for compensation in money, bonds,
or other forms of wealth. "Enemies of the State" were excluded from compensation, I.e.,
German nationals or their sympathizers. Willingness to pay "full" compensation was apparently voiced by the Czech Government. See Sharp, Nationalization of Key Industries In
Eastern Europe 46 (1946). However, as Hilary Mine, a one-time Communist member of
the Polish Provisional Government, stated: "I think I represent the whole nation when I
say that just compensation should be paid to such an extent, in such form, conditions, and
terms that it would not handicap the development of our economy." Address by Hilary
Minc to the National Council of Poland, Broadcast by Radio Warsaw, Jan. 2, 1946, in
Sharp, op. cit. supra at 46-47.
78. See generally Doman, Compensation for Nationalized Property in Post-War Europe,
3 Int'l L.Q. 323 (1950) ; Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48
Colum. L. Rev. 1125 (1948).
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In the United States, the International Claims Settlement Act of
1949,11 supplementing these peace treaties, provided that assets of
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania or their nationals, frozen under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, 8 could be liquidated to satisfy American
claimants should the treaties be dishonored. In 1955, the International
Claims Settlement Act was extended to provide recovery through such
liquidation for property nationalized subsequent to these treaties, 1 with
individual claims to be determined by a Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission established for that purpose. The liquidation of frozen
assets, however, proved insufficient to pay in full the claims adjudicated
by the Commission, necessitating supplementary strategies, 12 as exemplified by the Rumaniancand Bulgarian negotiations. In March 1960,
the United States and Rumania agreed to a lump-sum settlement of
$24,526,370 for claims arising out of Rumanian wartime takings payable under the peace treaty, postwar nationalization claims, and unsatisfied contractual obligations arising principally out of prewar defaulted government bonds. s3 Previously, the Commission had found the
realized value of the frozen assets to be $22,026,370 and, therefore,
insufficient to satisfy its awards totalling! $34,729,291.4 The 1960 settlement merely supplemented the liquidated frozen assets by an additional
$2,500,000 payable in five installments over four years.8 The liquidation of Bulgarian assets yielded $2,700,000 against commission awards
amounting to $4,600,000, exclusive of interest. In January 1961, the
United States Government opened negotiations with Bulgarian representatives, as previously done with Rumania, with hopes of obtaining
additional payment."0
The presence of $46,800,000 in Yugoslav gold in the United States,
part of which was transferred to federal reserve banks by Yugoslavia
during the German occupation and frozen by the United States under
79. 64 Stat. 12 (1950), amended by 69 Stat. 562 (1955), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 16214 2p (1958).
SO. 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-40 (1953).
S1. 69 Stat. 562 (1955), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-4 2p (1953).
82. See generally Drucker, The Nationalization of United Nations Property in Europe,
36 Transact. Grot. Socy 75 (1951); Ujlaki, Compensation for the Nationalization of
American-Owned Property in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, 1 N.Y.L.F. 265 (1955).
83. See Christenson, The United States-Rumanian Claims Settlement Agrcement of
March 30, 1960, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 617, 620 (1961).
84. See Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, Eleventh Semiannual Report to the Congress for the Period Ending Dec. 31, 1959, at 1 (1960).
85. Christenson, The United States-Rumanian Claims Settlement Agreement of March
30, 1960,55 Am. J. Int'l L. 617, 622 (1961).
S6. 44 Dep't State Bull. 150 (1961).
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the Trading With the Enemy Act, enabled the two nations in 1948 to
settle claims arising out of Yugoslav foreign wealth deprivations estimated at $150 million. The United States agreed to release the frozen
assets in return for $17 million, payable
in forty-five days, through
87
partial liquidation of the blocked gold.
Western European countries have not relied exclusively upon the
manipulation of frozen assets to achieve settlements with the Eastern
European States, but have sought to associate compensation with collateral trade agreements. Thus, in 1946, Czechoslovakia agreed to pay
Britain £8 million over ten years as against claims exceeding £100 million. By a related agreement Britain consented to the average annual importation of £575,000 of Czech goods, Czechoslovakia agreeing to pay
part of the £8 million compensation out of the profits derived therefrom. 8
To effectuate these terms, Britain agreed, in addition, to loan Czechoslovakia the funds necessary to refurbish her industrial plant. A similar accord was reached between Britain and Yugoslavia in 1949, by which £25
million in claims were settled by a payment of £4,500,000.9 A British
compensation agreement with Poland amounted to but one-third of the
°
investments taken."
Other Western European nations have negotiated comparable agreements.91 Swiss compensation arrangements with Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia, however, in addition to being tied to trade agreements,
provided for deferred payment in return for reimbursement in Swiss
francs.9" The delivery of raw materials illustrates yet another means of
compensation, as when France agreed to accept specified quantities of
Polish coal over a number of years. 3
While Seymour Rubin has suggested that the United States is unable
87. See Drucker, Compensation for Nationalized Property: The British Practice, 49 Am.
J. Int'l L. 477 (1955). See also Ujlaki, Compensation for the Nationalization of AmericanOwned Property in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, 1 N.Y.L.F. 265 (1955).
88. H.M.S.O. Cmnd. no. 56, Oct. 22, 1956. See Drucker, supra note 87; Drucker, The
Nationalization of United Nations Property in Europe, 36 Transact. Grot. Soc'y 75 (1951);
Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law 146 (1959).
89. Drucker, supra note 87.
90. Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/119, at 58 (1959).
91. France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland are noted. Id. at 59.
92. See Aubert, Foreign Expropriation in Swiss Law, 6 Am. J. Comp. L. 577, 586 (1957);
Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative Approach, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev.
458, 461 (1950). A Swiss-Rumanian accord provided that twenty-five per cent of the
agreed compensation be paid from frozen Rumanian assets in Swiss banks. See Garcia
Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/119, at
59 (1959).
93. Ibid.
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to arrange lump-sum settlements without the aid of blocked assets? 4

events surrounding the July 1960 agreement between the United States
and Poland may belie this conjecture and may suggest new avenues of approach.P5 Poland agreed to pay $40 million over twenty years and to
negotiate directly with American holders of $45 million worth of Polish
Government bonds issued between 1919 and 1939 in exchange for the
release of $1 million in frozen Polish assets. In addition, it should be

noted that within the last four years the Export-Import Bank has loaned
Poland over $61 million and the United States has sold to Poland, at low
prices, farm produce, authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance ActP0 valued at over $293 million. 7 The combined effect
of these superficially unrelated arrangements may indicate a significant

development in the attitude of the United States in meeting the difficulties which arise from extensive deprivations.

Few postwar Western-European nationalizations directly affected
aliens. At least one French nationalization, nevertheless, illustrates the
difficulty of applying orthodox preferences even against an economicallyadvanced depriving State. Thus, in 1946, former alien investors in the
nationalized French gas and electric industry were compensated with
bonds of the Caisse Nationale d'Equipemcnt de l'EkcctricitN et du,Gaz

at three per cent annual interest, amortizable over fifty years. 3 Apparently, there were few international agreements modifying the effect
of the nationalization law upon foreign investors. Yet, in spite of an

94. Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative Approach, 17 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 458, 465 (1950).
95. The text of the agreement itself is set forth in 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 452 (1961).
96. 6S Stat. 454 (1954), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 691-724 (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-19CO).
97. See N.1. Times, July 17, 1960, p. 1, col. 4. A similar but earlier negotiatcd !Atlement without the use of blocked assets evolved from the United States-Bolivian negotiations
following the Bolivian nationalization in 1952 of three, largely fordgn-owned, tin-mining
companies which together produced about 755 of Bolivia's tin, among them the American
controlled Patino combine. Bolivia offered q21.3 million to the companies who ,alucd their
holdings at a minimum of $60 million. A subsequent study of the company incomcs enablcd
the Bolivian Government to "counterclaim" for $520 million, a sum repreenting "illegal
profits," dubious foreign exchange manipulations, and tax e=asion. Bolivian consent to pay
full compensation to deprived United States interests elicited United States Government
pledges to purchase 15,oo tons of tin at world market prices, to double its Point Four
Aid to Bolivia, and to provide new technical assistance. Bolivia agreed to allocate a percentage of total tin production revenues to the reimbursement of American Patino inter,-t,
an obligation which ceased, however, when the price of tin fell below eighty cents per
pound. See Thomas, Protection of Property of Citizens Abroad, 1 Procee-dint' of the 1959
Institute on Private Investments Abroad (The Southwestern Legal Foundation) 417,
437-38 (1959).
9S. See Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 43 Colum. L.
Rev. 1125, 1142 (1948).
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Anglo-French agreement fixing compensation in the form of three per
cent credit-vouchers payable over a seven-year period, former British
investors in the gas and electric industry were apparently paid but
seventy per cent of their total investments."
In 1951, Iran, "for the Happiness and Prosperity of the Iranian Nation" nationalized its British-dominated concessionary, the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company, with provisions to set aside up to twenty-five per cent of
the oil revenues, minus exploitation expenses, to meet expected claims.0'0
Upon Iranian refusal to arbitrate, Great Britain, assuming the Company's
claims, began extensive but futile appeals to available international legal
authorities and political bodies.' By 1953, a financial crisis caused by
British blockades and the severance of diplomatic relations precipitated
the collapse of the Mossadegh regime. Meanwhile, the oil market normally served by Iran had been largely absorbed by American oil companies, 1 2 thus aggravating an already complex situation, since any
compensation would of necessity be supplied from Iranian oil sales
proceeds. This difficulty was resolved in 1954 by an agreement establishing an international consortium to market the oil and operate the industry
as agents of the Iranian Government and the new National Iranian Oil
Company.0 3 The second part of this agreement, concerning the measure
and method of compensation, proved inconsistent with orthodox requirements, the Iranian Government undertaking to pay £25 million to the
Anglo-Iranian Company over a ten-year period. 0 4 In addition, the agreement permitted the consortium companies, of which the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company was but one, to include in their operating costs over ten
years the sum of £67 million, thereby reducing the profits from which
royalties would otherwise accrue to the principal National Iranian Oil
Company. It is difficult to ascertain the amount of additional compensation indirectly afforded the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, since the under99. See Scbwarzenberger, The Protection of British Property Abroad, 5 Current Legal
Problems 295, 307 (1952).
100. See generally Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952 (1954); Bishop,
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 45 Am. J. Int'l. L. 749 (1951); Frankel, The Anglo-Iranian

Dispute, 6 Yb. World Aff. 56 (1952); Frankel, The Middle East in Turmoil, 10 Yb. World
Aff. 84 (1956).
101. The International Court of Justice pronounced that it lacked jurisdiction. AngloIranian Oil Co. Case, I.C.J. Rep. 89 (1951). Appeals to the United Nations Security Council
also provided no relief. See Thomas, Protection of Property of Citizens Abroad, 1 Proceedings of the 1959 Institute on Private Investments Abroad (The Southwestern Legal
Foundation) 417, 443-44 (1959).
102. See Rubin, Private Foreign Investment 92 (1956).
103. See Farmanfarma, The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the International Oil
Consortium: The Law Controlling, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 259, 287 (1955).
104. Id. at 261.
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lying profit-sharing agreements within the consortium are reputedly of a
private nature. 1' 5 It is probable, however, that the total compensation
was well below the "full" value of the property taken.
Emanating from this background, but prior to the settlement, the case
of Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate °0 demonstrated the urgent
need to reevaluate the "rules" applicable to extensive wealth deprivations. There, the Supreme Court of Aden was confronted with issues
raised by the Iranian nationalization through the necessity of determining the ownership of an attached oil cargo.1 7 The court held that the
oil had been taken originally by Iran without "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation, thus rendering the nationalization confiscatory
and illegal. Iran, therefore, could not lawfully pass title to third parties.
Refusing to differentiate between limited and extensive deprivations, the
court, in effect, would have totally precluded Iran, with but $239 million
in gold and foreign exchange in its treasury, from exercising her legitimate sovereign rights in nationalizing an oil industry worth an estimated
$1 billion."' The court's position would seem in marked contrast to the
subsequent more realistic "partial" compensation settlement which
reflected a practical accommodation of the opposing exclusive interests
of the parties.
The most recently settled extensive-deprivation dispute began with the
Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956.103 Almost
105. Id. at 261-62.
106. 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (1953).
107. Subsequent cases in Great Britain have criticized this case, e.g., In re Helbert
Wagg & Co., 2 Weekly L.R. 183, 195 (1956). Also, Italian and Japanese courts, on the
same facts, reached opposite results. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Sodet S.U.P.O.R., 49
Am. J. Int'l L. 259 (Civil Tribunal of Rome 1954); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. SoletX
Unione Petrolifera Orientale, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 509 (Civil Tribunal of Venice 1953); AngloIranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1953 Int'l L. Rep. 305 (High Ct. of
Tokyo 1953), where the High Court of Tokyo stated that the nationalization law "is not
a completely confiscatory law . . ." but was "subject to payment of compensation." While
recognizing the "rule" of international law against confiscation, the court held it could not
examine the adequacy of the compensation if some payment were given. While the court
stated that "in the event of a violent social reform or revolution" a State must make
"adequate, efficient and immediate" compensation to deprived aliens, the court declined
to find, paradoically, "any established rules of international law governing the matter,"
and, so, did not pass upon the validity of the Iranian Oil Nationalization Law. Ibid. See
generally for a discussion of these cases, O'Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation,
4 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 267 (1955).
10S. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952 (1954).
109. See generally Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Lcsucs of Public
and Private International law, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 755 (1957); Huang, Some International
and Legal Effects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 Am. 3. Int'l L. 277 (1957).
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all Company shares were alien-owned at the time of the taking. The
Egyptian decree promised that shareholders would be compensated "in
accordance with the value of the shares" on the Paris Bourse the day
preceding the decree, but payable only after Egypt acquired possession
of all the Company's assets at home and abroad. As Delson has noted,
such a promise may well have been "illusory" since foreign governments
are not apt voluntarily to relinquish assets under their control. 10 The
immediate effect of the Egyptian decree was to precipitate an international crisis resulting in the freezing of Egyptian assets estimated at
$420 million in Great Britain and $50 million in the United States,'
followed by an abortive British and French military intervention. By a
subsequent negotiated Heads of Agreement on April 29, 1958,112 the
United Arab Republic, "as a full and final settlement," agreed to relinguish all claims to all Company assets located abroad and to pay
28,300,000 Egyptian pounds (28.442 billion French francs) to the
foreign shareholders of the Suez Canal Company. The agreement
provided for an initial payment of 5,300,000 Egyptian pounds acquired
through retained "transit tolls" collected in Paris and London since
July 26, 1956, with the balance of the 28,300,000 Egyptian pounds payable in six installments over five years free of interest'" in pounds
sterling in London and in French francs in Paris. According to Rauschning," 4 the market value of the Suez Canal Company capital and profit
shares at the closing of the Paris Bourse on July 26, 1957 totalled 81.807
billion French francs;1" i.e., the value of the rights "of those who
deserve compensation." Company assets outside the United Arab Republic remained under foreign shareholder control. In turn, these shareholders assumed responsibility for all external liabilities. The total
external assets, according to the Company's last balance sheet (December 31, 1956), were valued at 56.527 billion French francs, while total
110. Delson, supra note 109, at 768.
111. See Domke, American Protection Against Foreign Expropriation in Light of the
Suez Canal Crisis, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (1957); N.Y. Times, March 2, 1957, p. 1.

col. 5; p. 13, col. 4.
112. 14 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 338 (1958), 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 493
(1960).
113. Rauschning conjectures that the exclusion of interest payments was due to the fact
that Great Britain had not paid interest on its debt to Egypt incurred during World War IL
Rauschning, Die Abwicklung des Suezkanalkonfliktes, 8 Jahrbuch fUr Internationales Recht
267, 275 (1959).
114. Id. at 273.
115. July 26, 1957 is the date selected by Rauschning for calculating the market value
of the shares because on this day the Suez Canal Company, as an Egyptian company, was
dissolved. The total "substance value" the Company claimed to have lost, Rauschnlng notes,
was 91.8 billion French francs.
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external obligations amounted to 41.326 billion French francs. The
net value of external Company property, therefore, was 15.204 billion
French francs. To the negotiated compensation of 28.442 billion French
francs (28,300,000 Egyptian pounds), Rauschning adds the net value of
the Company's external assets (15.204 billion French francs) to arrive
at a total indemnity to the foreign shareholders of 43.643 billion French
francs. This represents but slightly more than fifty per cent of the
market value of 81.807 billion French francs for Company shares =an amount well below what might have been deemed "full" compensation.
IV.

THE ImPLICATIONS OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

None of these twentieth century settlements appear to have complied
with orthodox preferences. Traditional standards, formed in another
era and still properly applied in limited takings, would seem severely
challenged, if not totally rejected in the extensive foreign wealth deprivation context. Appeals to the somewhat metaphysical standard of
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation are not only unrealistic
in this setting, but frustrate efforts to achieve at least minimum stability
of interaction in a world of violent and radical change. Moreover, to
proclaim the fundamental moral propriety of this standard for extensive
deprivations is to seek to impose Judeo-Christian norms upon diverse
political and social systems which are becoming increasingly skeptical of
"universal" and "customary truths" largely formulated without their
participation." 7 Such preoccupation with a misleading morality inhibits
the focusing of responsible attention upon realistic solutions to the
dilemmas presented. Happily, the practice of claimant States in negotiating these settlements testifies to their recognition, albeit reluctant, of
the sui generis character of extensive deprivations. The need to abandon
orthodoxy and seek alternative measures through which all interests may
be better protected, therefore, would seem imperative.
There are those who contend, however, that because these negotiated
116. It is difficult to understand why Rauschning includes the net e-ternal az2ts ansa
part of the total indemnity, since, despite her initial claims, the United Arab Republic
never acquired possession of them.
117. Thus Guha Roy has written: "As the international community wan confined, during by far the longest period of its growth, to the Western Christian Powers, the bulk
of international law, if not the whole of it, represents their common customs and traditions
which need not be, and in most cases are not, the common customs and traditions of the
other Powers, and, in any event, the Powers that secured their admittance to the Family
of Nations after World War II were not parties to the agreements and understandings on
which, after all, international law is, in its last analys, based." Is the Law of Rezponsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am. J.
Int'l L. 863, S67 (1961).
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settlements are in the nature of treaties and consequently not representative of customary international law, they fail to detract whatsoever
from universally recognized traditional standards of compensation.11
Their contention, however, is self-limiting, for, though municipal courts
have invoked the orthodox requirements,'" no international tribunal
has yet passed upon the question of compensation in an extensive
deprivation case. 20 To suggest, moreover, that internationally negotiated settlements which seek the fair adjustment and compromise of
conflicting interests are but quasi-legal aberrations, not indicative of uniformity, is to espouse a parochial view of international law. As Carlston
has observed: "The function of law in the international society . . .
must be to support and promote the viability of the society in which it
operates." " ' Because it contemplates the reduction of tensions across
state boundaries, international law must reflect and be responsive to the
vicissitudes of socio-economic and political relationships between, among
and within States. The diverse sources of international law set forth in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 122 to
assume any significance, must encompass the "total flow of explicit communications and acts of collaboration among peoples which create
community-wide expectations that certain uniformities in decision will
successfully survive challenge."'2 3 These uniformities are evidenced in
the wide spectrum of human activity, not only in tribunal decisions,
treaties, and international contracts, but in the practice of states
"dictated by political and practical realities,"' 124 diplomatic correspond118. See Wortley, The Protection of Property Situated Abroad, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 739, 764
(1961).

119. It should be noted that Article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, enumerating the sources of international law to which it will turn for guidance,
gives lowest priority to municipal court decisions: "Subject to the provisions of article 59,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations [are] ...subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
120. Perhaps the sole instance in which the International Court of Justice came close
to deciding the merits of these questions was when it decided it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the Anglo-Iranian Oil dispute. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 45 Am. J. Int'l L.
749 (1951).
121. Carlston, Nationalization: An Analytical Approach, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 405, 429
(1959).
122. 59 Stat. 1055, T.IA.S. No. 993 (June 26, 1945).
123. McDougal, Study Materials for a Course at Yale Law School in the Public Order
of the World Community (mimeographed).
124. See Carlston, Nationalization: An Analytical Approach, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 405, 431
(1959), who would maintain that such considerations are not relevant determinants of International law. This would appear inconsistent with his view of the nature of international
law. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
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ence, the polemics of publicists and pressure groups, and the public and
private utterances of world leaders. The contemporary world, composed
of sovereign nations, is characterized by the absence of a supranational
authority by which state action can be effectively regulated. International economic and political stability, therefore, is dependent upon
mutual expectations of reciprocity, self-restraint, and, if need be, reprisal.
A wide range of sources must be analyzed to discern not only the uniform restrictions on past state behavior, but to predict future uniform
restrictions which States may reasonably be expected to accept. In
short, international law is not a body of "rules" which may be gleaned
from textbook headings, relatively unchanged over time.
Even advocates of "partial" compensation, although acknowledging
the consequences of the distinctions between limited and extensive deprivations, fail to relate their realistic appraisals to the fact that States are
searching today for practical alternatives to traditional norms by which
amicable and profitable political and economic intercourse, greatly
disrupted by extensive deprivations, may be restored.'3 Many proponents of "partial" compensation have taken an essentially negative
approach, choosing merely to undercut what they deem to be the outmoded orthodox requirements of compensation, rather than promoting
the positive formulation of fruitful lines of inquiry for arriving at realistic settlements, which can balance the depriving State's enrichment
with the alien's loss.1l
Such inquiry should be essentially pragmatic: What, if any,
compensation has been offered by the depriving State and in what
form? Will the preferred compensation be sufficient to encourage
and maintain investment in the same or other sectors of the depriving
State if desired? What is the fair market value of the property taken?
What valuation methods were used and was property depreciation
considered? Should the value of intangible property be included within
the settlement and, if so, of which types? How many alien claimants are
involved? Is the depriving State a "capital importing" or a "capital exporting" nation? Is the claimant State a "capital importing" or a
"capital exporting" nation? What amounts of foreign exchange are
available in each country? What weight should be given to possible currency devaluations? What is the gross national product of the depriving
125. Rauschning, viewing the Suez settlement as a lesson in "sobriety," observd that
the agreements reflected a realization of men in power of the mutual interdependlcnce of
their countries, especially with regard to international water routes. Rauschning, Die
Abwicklung des Suezkanalkonfliktes, S Jahrbuch fOr Internationales Recht 267, 276 (1959).
126. Of course, underlying all relevant inquiry is the problem of determinin the limited

or extensive character of the deprivation. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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State? What is the earning capacity of the depriving or claimant State
vis-h-vis other nations? Has the depriving State a monocultural economy; if so, what are the relevant world market fluctuations? Are nationals of the taking State also deprived? Does the constitution of the
depriving State require compensation for its own nationals? Would high
compensatory demands be prohibitive to the depriving State? Is it in the
interest of the claimant State to promote the social and economic welfare
of the depriving State? How diverse are the investments of the claimant
State's nationals and how many of these are subject to possible future
seizure? Are there assets which the claimant State can seize for compensatory purposes? Can the dispute be partially solved by trading arrangements? Are future profits of the nationalized industry foreseeable
and could some indemnification be readily derived therefrom? Is the tax
structure of the depriving State such as to enable compliance with the
compensation claims? Of what character are the current political relations between the two nations? Given current national sensitivities on
both sides, could a more equitable settlement be obtained at a future
time? Is a final settlement sought or may the issues be subsequently
reopened?
Some of these and other questions have arisen in practice and have
been resolved differently in each case. None may be properly answered
by fixed and predetermined "rules," but only upon an ad hoc basis.12 7
If equitable solutions to the dilemmas presented by extensive depriva127.

As we have seen, twentieth century settlements have afforded a variety of means

through which compensation has been obtained, e.g., the use of frozen assets, tying compensation to trade agreements, paying compensation over a period of time out of the profits

of the nationalized enterprise, the use of government bonds, and commodity-barter arrangements.
An interesting development in twentieth century settlement techniques is illustrated by
the recent negotiations between the United States and Brazilian Governments concerning
the nationalization of an estimated six to eight million dollars of holdings in the Companhia
Telefonica Nacional, a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph, by the state
government of Rio Grande do Sul. United States and Brazilian officials agreed upon a
"temporary" compensation formula involving a Brazilian Government loan to the Company
in an amount equal to 80%6 of the estimated value of the installations seized. It was
agreed that the Company would reinvest this sum in Brazil in one of its manufacturing
and, therefore, less politically vulnerable, subsidiaries. Future compensation negotiations

between Brazilian and Company officials will seek, apparently, to implement this initial
plan. In addition, the Brazilian Government, by executive decree, moved to prevent future

takings of foreign assets by state governments. This negotiated agreement is consistent
with, and is a direct result of, the new United States aid and development program for
Brazil, by which American investors are encouraged to shift their holdings from politically
sensitive sectors, such as public utilities, into manufacturing and production. To facilitate

this transition, the Brazilian Government will finance the reinvestment by purchasing the
utility holdings. See N.Y. Times, April 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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fions are to keep pace with contemporary realities, progressive scholarly
attention must shift from the mere dilution of orthodox standards, to
the formulation of patterns of inquiry which will afford new bases for
negotiation and render more efficacious the use of established twentieth
century settlement techniques.
Those who expressly state or intimate, on the other hand, that under
customary international law a State is not obliged to pay any compensation whatsoever, either in limited or extensive deprivations,"- would,
like those indiscriminately favoring the orthodox view, frustrate comprehensive factual inquiries which seek the maximum accommodation of the
interests and expectations of the claimants as well as the restoration of
economic and political intercourse. It is widely recognized that States
must provide some indemnification to deprived alien owners. It is
indispensable to the peaceful functioning of international wealth processes that there be minimal assurance that economic participants will not
be forced to forsake entirely the fruits of their labors. Reparation, as
a canon of the international law of state responsibility, is "a germinal
principle of bare justice." -O As Eagleton has stated:
Historically, the idea of a responsibility between States may be traced back to
the vague origins of rights and duties which have always been regarded as fundamental by mankind. Among these is the conviction that reparations should be made
for an injury committed; and this idea of responsibility, whether between persons or
States, is as old as morality itself. 130
Acceptance of this fundamental belief is not limited to capitalistoriented nations.13 ' A close examination of relevant international ageements to which Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia,
123. E.g., Strupp, Le Litige Roumain-Hongrois Concernant les Optants Hongrois en
Territoire Roumain, La Reforme Agraire en Roumainie 450 (1927); M irillams, Intcrnational
Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 1 (1923). Barring contrary treaty
obligations, the view of the Soviet Union would apparently deny any such obligation for
the reason that nationalization measures fall "exdusivey within the internal competence"
of the depriving State. See The Suez Canal Problem, Dep't State Pub. 6392, 6396, 6397
(1956). This would appear consistent with the Soviet Union's refusal to pay any compnsation to deprived aliens for losses resulting from the early Soviet nationalizations. Sea
N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1961, p. 13, col. 4.
129. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of
Universal International Law?, 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 863 (1961). The canon is one of longstanding, for as Grotius once stated: "Fault creates the obligation to make go d the lo=s."
De Jure Belli Ac Pads. bk. II, ch. xvii, § 1, p. 430 (1646 ed. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace transl. 1925).
130. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 16 (1923).
131. See Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts-A Reply,
54 Am. J. Int'l L. S01, S03-04 (1960); Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International
Responsibility, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/119, at 46 (1959).
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and other socialist-oriented States have been contracting parties, indicates the recognition of an obligation to afford some indemnification in
extensive deprivations.132 Indeed, these same States, while not always
compensating their own nationals for losses suffered through domestic
acts, will demand recovery if the wealth of their nationals is subjected
to foreign seizure, even by similar economically-oriented States. 3 3 The
issue is not, therefore, as noted earlier, whether at least some compensation must be forthcoming. Those who contend that unless there is strict
adherence to orthodox theory one will be driven to conclude "that there
is no obligation under international law to pay any compensation whatsoever," 34 not only belabor a question already resolved by state practice
and overwhelming legal opinion, but obscure the proper focus of legal
inquiry into available realistic alternatives.
Nor can the duty to compensate in extensive deprivation be said to be
measured solely by the "convenience of the wrongdoer." Kenneth S.
Carlston has argued, against the background of postwar global settlements, that
injured states were not likely to concede that nationalizing states were entitled
as of legal right to pay less than adequate [full] compensation. If such were the
rule of law, then reparation would be measured by convenience of the wrongdoer
instead of injury to the victim. 135

The depriving State's ability to pay is, concededly, a determinative
factor, but only one of many which decision-makers must examine. It
cannot be overemphasized that extensive wealth deprivation settlements
have evolved from extended processes of claim and counterclaim and
have not been determined solely by the unilateral convenience of either
132. See Baade, supra note 131 at 804; Bindschedler, La Protection do ]a Proprl6t6
Priv~e en Droit International Public, 90 Hague Academy des Receull des Cours 173, 252-71
(1956) ; Foighel, Nationalization-A Study of the Protection of Alien Property in International
Law 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 143, 145-47 (1957). Bystricky, however,

asserts that nationalization without compensation is permissible under international law.
See Seidl-Hohenveldern, Communist Theories on Confiscation and Expropriation, 7 Am.
J. Comp. L. 541, 546 (1958). After his careful analysis of the views of communist States,
Seidl-Hohenveldern concludes that "apart from specific obligations among states to the
contrary, a state should have the basic right to nationalize foreign as well as domestic
property in its own territory, but only against payment of reasonable compensation."
Id. at 542.
133. See Katzarov, The Validity of the Act of Nationalization in International Law,
22 Mod. L. Rev. 639, 647 (1959).
134. Becker, Just Compensation in Expropriation Cases: Decline and Partial Recovery,
53 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proceed. 336, 339 (1959). See also Comment, Foreign Seizure of
Investments: Remedies and Protection, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 606, 610 (1960).
135. Carlston, Nationalization: An Analytical Approach, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 405, 430-31
(1959).
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depriving or claimant States, but by mutual promises of reciprocity
and restraint based upon the common interests of both parties and of the
international community.
"Convenience of the wrongdoer," however, as a determinative factor,
cannot be equated with the depriving State's willingness to pay. As
observed, the requirement that at least some compensation be paid is clearly
necessary for the equitable accommodation of all interests and is fully
supported by time-honored prescriptions of international law. Nowhere
does international law dictate that compensation, in either limited or
extensive takings, be dependent upon the depriving State's willingness
to make reparation. Because international law must harmonize the
exclusive interests of the depriving State with the common interest of the
international community, the least that may be expected of the depriving State are acts indicative of its good faith willingness to achieve
equitable settlement. Discriminatory acts of a "wanton, riotous, and
oppresive"' 3 6 nature or denials of procedural justice may well reflect a
lack of such good faith, sometimes justifying resort by the claimant
State to reprisals 137 aimed at forcing a favorable settlement. 3 s Thus, the
136. See Walter Fletcher Smith Case, (Smith v. Compafila Urbanizadora del Parque de
Marianno), U.S. State Dep't Press Release, May 16, 1929; 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 304, 337
(1930).
137. Reprisals have ranged from tariff manipulations to direct military intervention.
Violent reprisals, however, should be discouraged as incompatible in a world striving, however inadequately, for minimum stability. See generally Schachter, The Enforcement of
International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1960).
138. Questions of "discrimination" and "denial of justice" in themsalves raise a host of
interpretative problems without the scope of this discussion, although their presence, either
alone or combined with other factors, may indicate a lack of good faith. It is not inappropriate to note, however, that traditional doctrine insists upon the "public utility" of
a foreign wealth deprivation. In discussing this prescription, publicists again fail to distinguish between limited and extensive deprivations, suggesting for each that the good
faith of the depriving State and the ialidity of the taking may be seriously quQtioned
in the absence of "public utility." It would seem apparent, however, that measures
of sweeping socio-economic reform are prima fade acts of "public utility." Indeed, the
very derivation of the terms "nationalization" and "socialization" presume measures
which promote the public welfare. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F.
Supp. 375 (S.DJNL.Y. 1961), 30 Fordham L. Rev. 523 (1962), however, the court noted,
in discussing the Cuban seizure of American property under Nationalization Law 351,
Official Gazette of Cuba, July 7, 1960 authorizing the taking of property or enterprises of
United States citizens, that "expropriation . . . was not reasonably related to a public
purpose involving the use of such property. The taking of the property was not justified
by Cuba on the ground that the state required the property for some legitimate purpo:2
or that transfer of ownership of the property was necessary for the security, defenne or
social good of the state. The taking was avowedly in retaliation for acts by the Government of the United States [in suspending the Cuban sugar quota], and was totally unconnected with the subsequent use of the property being nationalized." 193 F. Supp. at 334.
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circumstances surrounding the two most recent extensive wealthdeprivation disputes yet to be settled-the 1958 Indonesian na140
tionalization of Dutch properties 39 and the 1959-1960 Cuban seizures
-cast serious doubts upon the good faith willingness of Indonesia and
Cuba to compensate deprived aliens. Foreign wealth deprivations,
According to this statement, it might be inferred that, despite the ostensibly discriminatory
intent, Cuba need only have altered the wording of the law to comply with the "public
utility" requirement. Moreover, exemplifying the interpretative problems inherent in
ascertaining "discrimination," it should be observed that this Cuban law might justifiably
be regarded as a counter-reprisal to an initial reprisal by the United States.
139. Thus, in December, 1958, the Indonesian Government nationalized Dutch properties by a decree which referred, inter alia, to the "struggle for the liberation of Irian Barat
[West New Guinea]." The measure of compensation was to be determined by a committee to be appointed by the Government and was to be regulated by subsequent legislation which, it appears, has never been enacted. Statements by Indonesian public officials
clearly indicated that no compensation would be forthcoming until the Dutch relinquished
West New Guinea. In addition, the decree affected only Dutch property, suggesting, in
light of bitter feelings between the two governments, a discriminatory Intent, since similar
property of other aliens remained undisturbed. The total import conveyed by the Indonesian behavior strongly suggests a lack of that good faith necessary to negotiate an
equitable compensation settlement. See generally Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts--A Reply, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 801 (1960); Domke, Indonesian
Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 305 (1960) ; McNair, The
Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal
Recht 218 (1959); Wortley, Indonesian Nationalization Measures-An Intervention, 55 Am.
J. Int'l L. 680 (1961) ; Comment, Foreign Seizure of Investments: Remedies and Protection,
12 Stan. L. Rev. 606 (1960).
140. The circumstances of the Ciban seizures cast serious doubts upon Cuba's good
faith willingness to pay any compensation whatsoever, despite recognition by Cuban laws
of a duty to compensate. For example, although the Fundamental Law of Cuba, replacing
the Constitution of 1942, acknowledges a duty to compensate, the 4',4% twenty-year bonds
promised in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 as payment, as far as may be ascertained,
have not yet been printed. It would appear that no inventories were taken nor receipts
given for the property seized. In addition, Law 851 of July 7, 1960, in specifically nationalizing American-owned properties, provided for compensation in government bonds with
terms of not less than thirty years at a minimum of 296 interest. The law further provided
that the bonds would be amortized out of a fund consisting of 25% of the foreign exchange
annually received by Cuba from United States' sugar sales, exceeding 3 million Spanish
long tons, at a price of not less than 5.75 cents per English pound. It would seem apparent
that, given the suspension of the Cuban sugar quota by the United States, the fund from
which compensation would be paid would be nonexistent. Moreover, it has been observed
that from 1950 to 1959 the monthly average price for Cuban raw sugar shipments to the
United States at no time exceeded 5.50 cents per English pound, making meaningless the
5.75 cents requirement of the Cuban law. Indeed, in only three years, from 1954 through
1959, were Cuban sugar sales to the United States in excess of 3 million Spanish tons. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 30 Fordham L. Rev. 523 (1962); Allison, Cuba's Seizures of American Business, 47 A.B.A.J. 48
(1961); N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1960, p. 10, col. 4; Everhart, I Had My Property Grabbed
by Castro's Men, U.S. News & World Report, March 7, 1960, p. 48.

1962]

"PROMPT, ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE"

757

whether limited or extensive, should "present the features of an orderly
attempt by officers of the law to carry out a formal order of condemnation."'' It would seem incumbent upon the State initiating the contest through foreign-wealth seizures to come forward with good faith
offers of compensation as a basis for future negotiation.
V.

APPRAIsAL AND CONCLUSION

There is little reason to believe that a realistic recognition of the inapplicability of orthodox preferences for "full" compensation to extensive
deprivations will encourage States to seize alien wealth. Recognition of
that which is already tacitly acknowledged by the actions of claimant
States is unlikely to be decisive in the future internal policies of depriving States. Such recognition reflects not deliberate evasion, but,
rather, the inherent impossibility of applying traditional standards to
patterns of economic activity not anticipated in the nineteenth century.
Indeed, were orthodox preferences to be conceded validity in this context, difficult problems concerning the viability of and respect for international law would be created, since States would nevertheless persist
in engaging in extensive deprivations. Nationalistic fervor, desires to
eradicate remnants of colonial pasts, and internal pressures for economic
and social reform will continue to be the primary factors motivating extensive deprivations. Far from being a "rule" of international law in the
extensive deprivation context, the demand for "full" or "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation would appear to be little more than
a preference assumed for bargaining purposes-an element of legal
mythology to which spokesmen pay ritualistic tribute and which has
little meaning in effective policy.4' Heralding the orthodox demand as
an immutable principle of international law, official pronouncements and diverse communication media may, unfortunately, both raise
and frustrate unwarranted expectations among individual claimants and
141.

Walter Fletcher Smith Case (Smith v. Compaffla Urbanizadora del Parque de

Marianao), U.S. State Dep't Press Release, May 16, 1929; 24 Am.

J. Int'l L. 3S4 (1930).

142. In a question and answer column concerning the facts about the Cuban deprivations, the New York Times broached the subject of payment for seized land: "The
Charge: That the United States in demanding 'speedy, efficient, and just' payment for

United States-owned lands seized by the Castro regime, was in effect telling Cuba: Pay
now, cash on the spot, and what we ask for our lands'-thus forcing Cuba 'to choose between an agrarian reform and nothing. The Facts: The United States never made such
a demand. Several times, it is true, the United States has asked the Cuban Government to
make 'prompt, adequate and effective compensation' to American citizens whoe lands had
been taken under the agrarian reform law. But the United States never demanded payment
'now, cash on the spot, and what we ask,' or attempted to impose any other fixed or rigid
terms. We sought only to bring about negotiation of the question of compensaion....
N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1960, p. 6, col. 5.
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the general public, thereby further exacerbating international relations
and hindering settlement efforts between the countries involved.148
We are all prone to presume that after economic, political, and social
upheavals, the "normalcy" of the status quo ante must be restored if
there is to be a return to stable international interaction. A new
"normalcy," however, is each day created by the adjustment of time and
the flow of human events. Twentieth century developments demonstrate
the urgent need not to fashion new abstract standards, but, while
rejecting outmoded preferences, to discover alternative analytical techniques by which the timing, amount, and form of compensation, consistent with the new "normalcy," may be realistically determined.
143. Moreover, insistence upon orthodox compensation principles, perhaps even when
used solely for bargaining purposes, may in some respects actually contradict the foreign
economic policies of many of the more prosperous nations by which they seek to encourage
the political, social, and economic growth of lesser-developed countries. In this connection,
it is significant that the United States Government, throughout the difficulties precipitated
by the recent Brazilian telephone company nationalization, would appear to have refrained from invoking orthodox compensation principles. See note 127 supra.

